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BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decision in a civil matter arising from the 
Third District Court, Summit County. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to S78-2-2. Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) [hereinafter referred to as 
"UCA"]. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Material Facts in Dispute 
In an appeal from a Summary Judgment, the appellate court should not 
defer to the trial court's ruling. First American Commerce v. Washington. 743 P.2d 
1193 (Utah 1987). 
The appellate Courts in Utah are to review the facts and the inferences 
therefrom to be drawn in the light that most favors the losing party and affirm only if it 
appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts. Ehlers & Ehlers 
Architects, v. Carbon County. 805 P.2d 789 (Ct. of App. 1991); Utah State Univ. v. 
Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982); Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah, 1984). 
In this case there are material factual issues that are in dispute. 
B. Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-No Mutual Mistake 
The trial judge ruled that "the obligations and duties of the parties never 
came into existence", which appears to be based upon a "mutual mistake of fact" theory. 
A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of the contracting, share 
misconceptions about basic assumptions or facts which they based their agreement upon. 
Robert Langston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554 (Ut. Ct. App., 1987); Mooney v. GR 
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& Associates. 746 P.2d 1174 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987). In this case there are material factual 
issues in dispute that preclude the entry of summary judgment based upon a mutual 
mistake. 
C. Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Discovery Not Completed 
The general rule in Utah is that "summary judgment should not be granted 
if discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may create issues of 
material fact sufficient to defeat the motion." Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co.. 745 
P.2d 838, 840 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987). In this case there are material factual issues which 
have not been the subject of discovery requests, and that should preclude the entry of 
summary judgment. 
D. Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Contract Not Integrated or 
Unambiguous 
Before the interpretation of a contract becomes a question of law, the 
contract must be integrated and it must be unambiguous. Draughton v. CUNA Mutual 
Insurance Society. 771 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989). When the language of the contract 
is ambiguous, the matter should be resolved by the taking of evidence. Morris v. 
Mountain States Tel.& Tel. Co.. 658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983). In addition, under the 
"doctrine of practical construction", the post-contract conduct of the parties which 
conflicts with the requirements of the contract may create the kind of ambiguity that will 
bring that doctrine into effect. Bullough v. Sims. 400 P.2d 20 (Utah 1965). Since the 
contract was ambiguous, the trial court should not have interpreted it as a matter of law. 
Therefore, the case should be remanded for a trial. 
2 
E. Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Waiver of Specific Financing 
The parties to a contract can expressly or implicitly waive performance 
violations in a contract. Johnson v. E.V. Cox Const. Co.. 620 P.2d 917, (Okla. App. 
1980). Summary judgment was not proper because of this waiver by the Defendants. 
F. Summary Judgment Improperly Granted-Oral Amendments to Contract 
The trial judge determined that "the terms of the written contract" are not 
subject to change by way of a post-execution oral agreement". The law in Utah is that 
any party to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any contract and the terms of 
the amendment will prevail over those of the original agreement. Ted R. Brown and 
Associates v. Carnes Corp. 753 P.2d 964 (Ut. Ct. App 1988). The written contract met 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds [§25-5-1 UCAj. Oral amendments to such a 
contract are enforceable if a party has changed his position in reliance thereon. White 
v. Fox. 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983). Since such changes complied with the Statute of 
Frauds, then all of these changes are made part of the agreement as a whole. Allen v. 
Kingdom 723 P. 2d 394 (Utah 1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action [hereinafter referred to as "the Litigation"] was brought [in 
September, 1990] by Paul and Merridee Fair, husband and wife, and residents of the 
state of Utah [hereinafter sometimes referred to jointly as the "Plaintiffs" or as the 
"Farrs"]. The Fairs instituted the Litigation against Pam and Bryce Royle [hereinafter 
sometimes referred to jointly as the "Defendants" or as the "Royles"] for, among other 
things, specific performance of the Earnest Money Agreement between the parties, 
dated July 24, 1990 [hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Earnest Money 
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Agreement"], and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to stay the Royles from 
purchasing another home on a subsequent offer made by them. 
The trial court ruled against the Plaintiffs' request for an injunction, 
because the Judge ruled that the Farrs had an adequate remedy at law [money 
damages]. [R.58]. Thereafter, the Farrs had the Complaint amended to include a cause 
of action for breach of contract. [R. 166 - 191]. Before any discovery was initiated by 
either party, the Royles filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was granted. 
Material Facts 
If the Court assumes that Plaintiffs facts are true [for purposes of summary 
judgment], and if they are interpreted and all inferences are drawn in the light most 
favorable for the Plaintiffs, then it is true that: 
On July 24, 1990, the Royles met with the Farrs at the Fairs' home for the 
purpose of getting their offer written into an earnest money agreement. [R. 143-148]. At 
this meeting, which was fairly short, the Royles stated that they both worked for Delta 
Airlines [she was the manager of the Delta Employees' Credit Union ["DECU"]] and 
that they planned to apply for a 95% LTV [loan to value] loan from DECU for their 
purchase. Id. They did not tell the Farrs that this was the only kind of financing that 
was acceptable to them or that they wanted to be able to have their mortgage payments 
taken out of their wages by their employer. Id. 
After this discussion, Mr. Fair wrote the terms of the agreement into a 
standard form earnest money agreement and it was reviewed and signed by all of the 
parties present. Id. On item 2 at the bottom of the first page, he wrote in the 
information as to the type of financing for which the Royles would initially be applying. 
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Id. Since the offer was subject to the sale of the Royles' North Salt Lake home, no 
definite date was set for the closing on this purchase. Id. 
If the Royles had proposed that a 95% LTV loan from DECU was the 
only type of financing that was acceptable to them, it would have been rejected by the 
Farrs because it would indicate that the Royles were not strong buyers or that they were 
not committed to the Farr's home. Id. The Earnest Money Agreement related to the 
sale of the Farrs' home [135 Woodland Place, Summit Park, Utah, hereinafter "Fairs' 
Home"] for $125,000. [R. 98-124 and Exhibit B, attached thereto]. 
Within about a week or so after the Farrs signed the Earnest Money 
Agreement with the Royles the Farrs made an offer on a home in Summit Park on 
Matterhorn Drive ["the Matterhorn house"], which offer was made subject to the Farrs 
selling of their home. [R. 143-148]. 
Shortly after the signing of the Agreement, Mrs. Farr had a phone 
discussion with Mrs. Royle during which it was agreed that the Fairs could put an 
exception in the Agreement for the downstairs window coverings. Id. After Mrs. Fan-
advised her husband of this discussion, he added such an exception for the downstairs 
window coverings to the original Earnest Money. Id. 
Prior to making that change to the Agreement, Mr. Farr had noticed that 
he had forgotten to have the parties initial the document at the bottom [as the form 
directs]. Id. A few days after the discussion relating to the window covering exception, 
a meeting was set up between Mrs. Farr and the Royles at the home of DeWayne 
Hansen [the Farrs' realtor on the offer they made on the Matterhorn home] in order to 
add the Royles' initials to the Agreement. Id. 
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At that time [about August 13, 1990], the Royles told Mrs. Farr and Mr. 
Hansen that they could not get a 95% LTV loan from DECU. Id. The Royles further 
said they would go ahead and apply for a 90% LTV loan from DECU, they did not 
anticipate that they would have any problems in obtaining this financing, and they would 
proceed to complete their agreed purchase of the Farrs' home. Id. Mrs. Farr agreed 
with them that they should make this application and proceed with the completion of 
their purchase of said home. Id. 
At this meeting the Royles proposed two changes to the agreement 
between the parties. Id. They wanted to have a specific closing date added to the 
Agreement and they suggested that perhaps the language in the Agreement should be 
changed to reflect that they were going to apply for a 90% LTV loan. Id. After some 
discussion, the Royles agreed with the Farrs on a closing date of September 12, 1990. 
Id. Mr. Hansen then wrote this language [12 Sept 90] into the original Agreement. Id. 
On the Royles' suggestion to change the language regarding the specific 
financing, Mr. Hansen said that it was not necessary to make that change because it was 
their obligation to find financing, and the particular type of financing was not important. 
Id. The Royles then reviewed the Agreement, as it had been modified, and placed their 
initials at the bottom of the form. Id. The Farrs had previously initialed the 
Agreement. Id. The Royles were given the original of the Agreement at that meeting 
to take to the DECU. Id. However, shortly thereafter, the Royles decided to buy a 
different house in Summit [same price, $125,000, except with a 90% LTV from the 
DECU] and they took no further steps to try and obtain financing for the purchase of 
the Farrs' home. Id. and [R. 273]. 
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The FHA will loan money on Summit County homes of up to $125,000 
and the amount down is less than 5%, and such financing is assumable, unlike that of 
the DECU. M. 
At the time the Farrs signed the Earnest Money Agreement with the 
Royles they understood the phrase "subject to Buyer qualifying for financing" to mean 
the Buyer making an application for a type of financing that is available in the area. At 
that same time, they understood the phrase "voidable at the option of the Seller" to 
mean that they had the option, acting in good faith, to have the Royles seek alternate 
types of financing if the type written on the Agreement fell through. Id. 
On August 18, 1990, the Royles sent Plaintiff a letter wherein they stated 
that the DECU would not make a 95% loan in Utah and they unilaterally declared the 
Earnest money Agreement to be void. [R. 98-124 and Exhibit D, attached thereto]. 
On August 22, 1991, the Royles made an offer on another Summit Park 
property with the same general terms as the offer they made on the Farrs' Home [same 
price, same terms, except a 90% DECU LTV loan] which offer was subsequently 
accepted. [R. 98-124 and Exhibit E, attached thereto] and R. 273, pg. 12, 16-18]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The lower court improperly prevented the Plaintiffs from conducting 
discovery and preparing there case for trial when it granted the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment because: 
1. There are material factual disputes in this case which need to be 
resolved at a trial. 
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2. There are material factual disputes in this case and no discovery has 
been done. Therefore, this case should be reversed and remanded so the parties may 
conduct discovery and prepare their cases for trial. 
3. There are material factual disputes in this case and there was no 
evidence before the trial court to support a "mutual mistake" theory. 
4. There are material factual disputes in this case and the Earnest 
Money Agreement at issue was not integrated or unambiguous. 
5. There are material factual disputes in this case and the Royles had 
waived their right to enforce the Earnest Money Agreement provision which required 
that they only seek a 95% LTV loan from the DECU. 
6. There are material factual disputes in this case and the Earnest 
Money Agreement at issue had been amended by the parties so that the Royles agreed 
to seek a 90% loan to complete their purchase of the Farrs' Home 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner asserts the following points of law in support hereof: 
I. UTAH LAW REGARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - MATERIAL FACTS 
IN DISPUTE 
In Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982), the 
Supreme Court outlined its concerns against the granting of a summary judgment, noting 
that in light of the Utah constitutional guarantee fConst, of Utah. Art. I, § 11] of access 
to the courts for redress of wrongs: 
[S]ummary judgment, which denies the opportunity of trial, 
should only be granted when it clearly appears that there is 
8 
no reasonable probability that the party moved against can 
prevail. IcL, at 720. 
With regard to the grant of summary judgments generally, the standard to 
be applied under Utah law is: 
A motion for summary judgment can only be granted when 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and even 
assuming the facts asserted by the party moved against to be 
true, he could not prevail . . . . 
Since the party moved against is denied the opportunity of 
presenting his evidence and his contentions, it should be and 
is the policy of the courts to act on such motions with great 
caution, to assure that a party whose cause might have merit 
is not deprived of the right to access to the courts for the 
enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs. Gadd v. 
Olson. 685 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah, 1984) (footnotes and 
quotations omitted). 
In applying this standard of review to the facts sub judice. we find that 
there are many material facts in dispute as to the terms of the agreement of the parties 
and the circumstances of this case, among other things. Since the Plaintiffs' facts are 
assumed to be true for purposes of summary judgment, then the lower court erred in 
granting Defendants' summary judgment motion. 
Material Facts in Dispute 
Among the material issues that are in dispute in this case, are the 
following: 
A. Whether the parties agreed that a 95% LTV loan from DECU was the 
only acceptable financing, which is what the lower court concluded? However, if we 
assume that Plaintiffs' facts are true, then the Farrs never agreed that a 95% LTV loan 
from DECU was the only acceptable financing. Therefore, the Royles did not act 
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properly when they unilaterally declared the Agreement to be void when they could not 
obtain such a 95% LTV loan. This is due, in part, to the fact that the Royles never 
made any other effort to obtain financing to purchase the Fairs' home after being 
advised that the 95% LTV was not available in Utah. As a result, they breached the 
obligation to proceed in good faith under the contract. Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857 
(Utah 1979). They clearly could have sought such alternate financing [since they did 
seek a 90% loan with the same principal amount from the DECU on their new 
purchase], and because they could have applied for a 95 + % LTV loan from the FHA. 
B. Whether the Royles had the authority, as the Buyer, to declare the 
Agreement void? A key provision of the Earnest Money Agreement states that "[i]f 
Buyer [Royles] is required to obtain outside financing [he] agrees to use his best efforts 
to obtain the same . . . , [and if he ] does not qualify . . . within 30 days . . ., this 
Agreement will be voidable at the option of the Seller [Farrs] upon written notice." 
This language gives the Farrs the option to keep the Royles obligated under the 
Agreement until financing alternatives can be explored. If we assume that Plaintiffs' 
facts are true, then the Farrs understood the phrase "voidable at the option of the 
Seller" to mean that they had the option, acting in good faith, to have the Royles seek 
alternate types of financing if the type written on the Agreement fell through. 
Therefore, the Royles acted in bad faith when they did not seek to obtain financing 
other that the 95% LTV loan. This means that summary judgment was improperly 
granted. 
C. Whether the parties had agreed to amend the Agreement so that they 
could apply for a 90% TV loan from the DECU? Even if the parties had originally 
agreed that the 95% LTV loan was essential, this provision was either amended to a 
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90% loan [as was agreed by the parties at the meeting to initial the Agreement] or its 
strict enforcement was waived by the Royles' assertion [at said meeting] that they would 
proceed to apply for a 90% loan in order to complete their purchase of the Farrs' home. 
If we assume that Plaintiffs' facts are true, then the Royles agreed to change the type of 
loan for which they would apply or they waived their right to strict performance of the 
original provision. However, since the Royles did not seek to obtain said 90% LTV 
loan from the DECU, they breached their good faith obligation under the Agreement 
and summary judgment was improperly granted for Defendants. 
Moreover, since the price on the new home which the Royles sought to 
purchase was the same as the Farrs [$125,000],and since the Royles have been 
approved for a 90% LTV mortgage to purchase this new home, then it is apparent that, 
acting in good faith, the Royles could have obtained the same loan to complete their 
purchase of the Fairs' Home. Four days after the Royles wrote the letter to declare the 
Agreement void, they signed a contract for the new home. 
In an appeal from a Summary Judgment, the appellate court should not 
defer to the trial court's ruling. First American Commerce v. Washington. 743 P.2d 
1193 (Utah 1987). 
The appellate courts in Utah are to review the facts and the inferences 
therefrom to be drawn in the light that most favors the losing party and affirm only if it 
appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts. Ehlers & Ehlers 
Architects, v. Carbon County. 805 P.2d 789 (Ct. of App. 1991); Utah State Univ. v. 
Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982); Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah, 1984). 
In this case there are material factual issues that are in dispute that preclude the 
summary disposition of this case. 
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H. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT PROPER BECAUSE DISCOVERY IS NOT 
COMPLETED 
The general rule in Utah is that "summary judgment should not be granted 
if discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may create issues of 
material fact sufficient to defeat the motion." Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co.. 745 
P.2d 838, 840 (Ut.Ct.App.1987). Since discovery and investigation are not complete in 
this case, then summary judgment was improperly considered by the lower court. Id. 
There are numerous issues before the Court that are unresolved at this 
stage in the proceeding, for example: 
1. Did Defendants timely file and pursue in good faith their 
obligations under the Earnest Money Agreement? 
2. Why was Defendants' application for financing turned down? 
3. Did the Defendants waive whatever rights they may have had to 
rely on the 95% LTV loan from DECU as the only source of financing, by reason of 
their post-Agreement actions or discussions? 
4. Are Defendants estopped to assert a breach of the Agreement, 
based on the 95% LTV loan from DECU language, by reason of their post-Agreement 
actions or discussions? 
5. Did the Defendants agree to amend the language in the Agreement 
[to whatever extent it is applicable] to require only a 90% LTV loan from DECU as the 
source of financing, by reason of their post-Agreement actions or discussions? 
6. Did the Royles have the authority, as the Buyer, to declare the 
Agreement void? 
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The general rule in Utah is that "summary judgment should not be granted 
if discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may create issues of 
material fact sufficient to defeat the motion." Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co.. 745 
P.2d 838, 840 (Ut.Ct.App.1987). This case was so "fresh" that discovery and investigation 
had barely begun and there were numerous material facts where discovery was much 
needed by the parties before the case should have been subject to a summary judgment 
motion. 
As can be seen from the Rule 56(f) Affidavit filed by Plaintiffs in 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 149 - 153] these are all factual 
areas where Plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to explore in this case. 
The trial court misapplied the law in this case and its ruling should be 
reversed. 
m. UTAH LAW REGARDING MUTUAL MISTAKE 
The trial judge ruled [R. 226 - 228] that "the obligations and duties of the 
parties never came into existence" due to the fact that (a) the DECU had no 95% loans 
available in Utah and (b) this was the only kind of financing acceptable to the parties. 
This language, and the recessional nature of the award, appears to be based upon a 
"mutual mistake of fact" theory. A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time 
of the contracting, share misconceptions about basic assumptions or facts which they 
based their agreement upon. Robert Langston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554 (Ut. Ct. 
App., 1987); Mooney v. GR & Associates. 746 P.2d 1174 (Ut.Ct.App. 1987). In this 
case there are material facts in dispute that preclude the entry of summary judgment 
based upon a mutual mistake. The most significant of which is the fact that [assuming 
the Farrs' facts to be true] they never agreed that a 95% LTV loan from the DECU was 
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the only type of financing for which the Royles had to apply. Therefore, there was no 
undisputed material facts which supported a mutual mistake of fact theory and the trial 
court's ruling was incorrect. 
IV. UTAH LAW REGARDING CONTRACT NOT INTEGRATED OR 
AMBIGUOUS 
Before the interpretation of a contract becomes a question of law, the 
contract must be integrated and it must be unambiguous. Draughton v. CUNA Mutual 
Insurance Society. 771 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989). There was no evidence before the 
trial court that the parties considered any particular contract to be a final statement of 
all of the terms of their agreement. Since there were no such facts presented, then the 
lower court should not have concluded that the Agreement was integrated. If the 
Agreement was not integrated, then summary judgment should be reversed. 
Even assuming arguendo that there was an integrated Agreement, Plaintiff 
is still entitled to a reversal of the summary judgment motion because the Agreement is 
ambiguous. When the language of the contract is ambiguous, then the matter should be 
resolved by the taking of evidence. Morris v. Mountain States Tel.& Tel. Co.. 658 P.2d 
1199 (Utah 1983). Both sides have advanced rational interpretations of what the key 
provisions of the Agreement should mean [e.g., (a) whether the 95% LTV loan from the 
DECU was the only type of financing for which the Royles had to apply, (b) whether the 
Defendants met their obligations under the Earnest Money Agreement in good faith, (c) 
what the phrase "subject to Buyer qualifying for financing" was intended to mean, (d) 
what the phrase "voidable at the option of the Seller" was to mean]. Therefore, the 
contract was ambiguous and should not have been interpreted as a matter of law by the 
trial court. Therefore, the case should be remanded for a trial. 
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Moreover, under the "doctrine of practical construction", the post-contract 
conduct of the Royles and the Farrs which conflicts with the requirements of the 
Agreement may create the kind of ambiguity that will bring that doctrine into effect. 
Bullough v. Sims. 400 P.2d 20 (Utah 1965). Assuming Plaintiffs' facts to be true, the 
Royles indicated that, even though they could not obtain a 95% loan from the DECU, 
they would still seek a 90% DECU loan in order to complete their purchase of the 
Farrs' Home. This action of the Royles flies in the face of an interpretation that a 95% 
loan was essential. Therefore, even if the Agreement appeared unambiguous on its face, 
the matter lower court's decision should be reversed due to the application of the 
practical construction doctrine. 
V. UTAH LAW REGARDING WAIVER OF CONTRACT PROVISION 
The parties to a contract can expressly or implicitly waive any required 
performance. Johnson v. E.V. Cox Const. Co.. 620 P.2d 917. (Okla. App. 1980). 
Plaintiffs' evidence shows that Defendants agreed that they would proceed to obtain a 
90% LTV DECU to purchase the Fairs' Home, when they found the 95% loan was 
unavailable. Assuming arguendo that the trial court correctly determined that a 95 % 
loan was all that was required by the contract, since Plaintiffs' evidence viewed most 
favorably for them shows that the Defendants waived the specific enforcement of that 
provision by agreeing instead to obtain a 90% loan for that purpose [and the Farrs, in 
return, agreed to a specific closing date at the Royles' request]. Thus, the summary 
judgment was not proper because of this waiver by the Defendants. 
VI. UTAH LAW REGARDING AMENDMENTS TO CONTRACTS 
The trial judge determined that "the terms of the written contract" are not 
subject to change by way of a post-execution oral agreement. The law in Utah is that 
15 
any party to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any contract and the terms of 
the amendment will prevail over those of the original agreement. Ted R. Brown and 
Associates v. Carnes Corp. 753 P.2d 964 (Ut. Ct. App 1988). The written Agreement in 
this case clearly meets the requirements of the Statute of Frauds [§25-5-1 UCA]. Oral 
amendments to a contract that is required to be in writing in order to comply with the 
Statute of Frauds are enforceable if a party has changed his position in reliance thereon. 
White v. Fox. 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983). In this case, the Farrs agreed to a specific 
closing date and continued to keep their Home off the real estate market in exchange 
for the Royles agreement to apply for a 90% LTV from the DECU. Therefore, this oral 
understanding meets the test under White and modifies the terms of the Agreement 
When such changes comply with the Statute of Frauds, then all of these 
changes are made part of the agreement as a whole. Allen v. Kingdon. 723 P. 2d 394 
(Utah 1986). In addition, since part of this understanding was memorialized on the 
Agreement itself [change in closing date], and the Royles initialed the same thereafter, 
then such change complied with the statute of frauds. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court improperly prevented the Plaintiffs from conducting 
discovery and preparing there case for trial when it granted the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Since there are material factual disputes in this case, then the 
lower court's ruling should be reversed. 
DATED this/ day of September, 1991. 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR 
& ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for PJaJnTfrTs~-Ar)pellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Alan Stewart 
4885 South 900 East 
Suite 306 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
.*& 
this day of September, 1991. 
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POOLE & VOROS, P.O. 
Attorneys for Defendants Royle 
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone (801) 263-3 344 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR and 
MERRIDEE FARR, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
BRYCE WILLIAM ROYLE, PAMELA 
ROYLE, DAN ZIEHM, and TOM 
HAYCOCK, dba FIRESIDE REAL 
ESTATE, 
Defendants, 
Defendants', Bryce William Royle and Pamela Roy]e (hereinaf-
ter referred to as "Royles"), Motion for Summary Judgment having 
come before the Court for decision pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule- 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, the 
Course having reviewed Royles Memorandum and Affidavits filed in 
support of their Motion, and the Plaintiffs1 response thereto, 
the Court being fully advised in the premises, and the Court hav-
ing issued its decision per Minute Entry dated January 24, 1991, 
now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants Royles are hereby awarded Summary Judgment 
against Plaintiffs on their Counterclaim for return of their 
B00K.KKPACE3 5 1 
vi LEW 
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CUfk »f Summit County 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 10799 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
earnest money deposit in the amount of $1,000.00, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from 
August 18, 1990, until the date of entry of this judgment in the 
sum of $46.85, for a total judgment of $1,046.85, said judgment 
to bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum 
from the date hereof until paid, 
2. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Royles be, and 
the same are hereby, dismissed with prejudice, 
3. The Court rules that neither party is entitled to an 
av/ard of attorney's fees inasmuch as there was a failure of a 
condition precedent, and as a result thereof there was no agree-
ment between the parties and there has been no default. 
JUDGMENT DATED this - / "^ _ day of February, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
FRANK G. NOEL, \T 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORI:: 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR 
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